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UCC SALES WARRANTIES
at no dollar cost to himself. Also, limiting the ultimate union
discipline to expulsion provides an internal restraint upon
unions to impose only reasonable fines, while at the same time
providing them with a real incentive to make themselves more
desirable so that members will opt to pay the fines rather than be
expelled.
WILLIAM J. DocmRY
Sales-Products Liability-Sales Warranties of the
Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code sales warranties have caused
several practical and theoretical problems in determining the appro-
priate basis of manufacturer liability in defective product cases.
The growth of non-fault liability,' either in tort or on the sales
contract, has been characterized by increasing permissiveness toward
consumer recovery against remote manufacturers. This note is
addressed to the relation between the Code scheme of recovery and
common law non-fault remedies.
The basic Code money-damages remedy' for a purchaser of
a defective product is an action on the sales contract for breach of
the seller's warranty, express or implied. The Code sales warran-
ties correspond roughly to those developed at common law.3 Section
' See Prosser, The Assaudt Upon the Citidel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [Hereinafter cited as Prosser].
2 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-711 for buyer's remedies in general.
All citations are made to the 1962 official text of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The Code has been adopted in forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia.
Prosser termed the sales warranty "a freak hybrid born of illicit inter-
course of tort and contract." The action for breach of warranty was origi-
nally on the case, a tort action, and resembled the action for deceit. Prosser
states that it was not until 1778 that an action on a contract for breach of
warranty was held to lie at all. However, once the action on the contract
was permitted, the defenses to breach of contract, principally lack of privity
and limitation of consequential damages, became entrenched in the law.
The warranty concept evolved, first through the food cases, to the point
where implied warranties were imposed by operation of the law regardless
of the seller's contractual undertaking. Liability was non-fault and in
effect tort duties were imposed on sellers. Since MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), removed the privity barrier
only with respect to negligence liability, courts invented a variety of devices,
such as fictitious agency or warranties running with the product, to circum-
vent the privity rules. See Prosser at 1124. However, the defense of lack
of privity to the breach of warranty action remains viable in many juris-
dictions, and, further, the warranty has retained elements of both tort and
19681
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2-313 (the express warranty) holds a seller responsible for his
representations to the buyer, section 2-314 (implied warranty of
merchantability) requires that the product be fit for any ordinary
use, and section 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness) requires fit-
ness for any particular use of which the seller is apprised before the
sale. The warranties arise only upon a sale of goods,4 can be dis-
claimed 5 and are contractual in theory.
0
The Code does not require an allegation of privity between
plaintiff buyer and defendant seller/manufacturer in a breach of
warranty action. The official comment states that the overall
position of the Code is that of neutrality. 7 However, section 2-318
extends the protection of the seller's warranties horizontally to
members of the buyer's family and household, and to guests in his
home: if the buyer can maintain an action, then these persons may
also.
The Code's warranty liability is, inferentially, limited to sellers
of goods.8 Further, section 2-715(2) (b) specifies that the buyer's
consequential damages for breach of warranty include "injury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of war-
ranty," and section 2-719(3) states that any limitation of conse-
quential damages "for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable." Sections 2-318, 2-715 (2) (b),
and 2-719(3) perpetuate the confusion of tort and contract remedies
which existed in the common law breach of warranty action.,
A potentially troublesome jurisprudential problem is present in
contract liability. See Comment, The Apportionment of Business Risks
Through Legal Devices, 24 CoLuM. L. REv. 335 (1924). The argument is
made that the privity requirement in warranty cases was an historical acci-
dent. See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
The evolution of the privity rule is discussed in detail in Prosser. See also
43 N.C.L. REv. 647 (1965).
'See note 8 infra.
'There is an exception: a limitation of liability for personal injury is
prima facie unconscionable unless all warranties have first been disclaimed.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(3).
' See Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California
Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 281, 309 (1961).
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, comment 3.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(1)(d); 2-106(1); 2-313(1) (a);
2-314(1); 2-315. But see UNIFOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 2.
See Fisher, Implied Warranties of Quality-A Tort Peg in a Contract
Hole, 11 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 262 (1956); Comment, Matrufacturer's
Liability to Remote Purchasers For "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or
Contract, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1966). See note 3, supra.
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Code related litigation. Hawkland argues that the Code was in-
tended to operate as a code in the civil law sense, that is, in this
context, as the only source of law governing commercial trans-
actions.'" The principal distinction between a civil law code and
ordinary legislation is that the former pre-empts its subject area."
From Hawkland's premise it can be argued that Article II of the
Code precludes common law remedies where the basis of liability
stems from a sale transaction.12
Hence in a typical products liability situation, where the con-
sumer will normally have in addition to the Code remedy a parallel-
and often overlapping-common law tort remedy, there will always
be lurking in the background a serious jurisprudential question over
the propriety of by-passing the Code remedy, even when the Code
remedy as contrasted with the common law remedy does not afford
full and fair relief. This did not constitute a critical problem at
the time the Code was drafted,' 3 1945-1952, since, at that time,
"0 Hawkland argues that the failure of the earlier uniform commercial
statutes can be attributed to their lack of pre-emption, system, and compre-
hension, and that this circumstance weighed heavily in the drafting of the
Code. Hawkland cites the concern of the chief architect of the Code, Karl
Llewellyn, over a (pre-Code) system of law which gave courts leeway in
selecting from among two or more alternative principals of law a principle
to settle a commercial dispute. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code"
Methodology, 1962 ILL. L. F. 291, 299 (1962).
"' "There is a wide difference between . . . a statute and a true code. A
'code' is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a whole
field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other law in its subject
area save only that which the code excepts." Id. at 292. UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 1-103 provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepre-
sentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating
or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. (Emphasis
added).
§ 1-104 provides:
This Act being a general act intended as a unified coverage of its
subject matter, no part of it shall be deemed to be impliedly repealed
by subsequent legislation if such construction can reasonably be
avoided. (Emphasis added).
See generally Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383
(1908).
1 Arguably, Article II should apply to commercial transactions analogous
to sales, such as leases and bailments. See Comment, The Uniform Com-
mercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 880
(1965).
1The history of the drafting of the Code is set out in Schnader, The
New Movement Toward Uniformity in Commercial Law--The Uniform
19681
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the warranty action was with some exceptions14 the only non-fault
remedy open to an injured consumer. However, six years subse-
quent to the drafting of the Code, the first of the strict tort liability
cases was decided. 5  This created an anomaly-at the time the
Code was drafted, sections 2-318, 2-715 (2) (b) and 2-719(3) were
intended to be, and at the time represented, a liberalization of con-
sumer remedies, yet subsequently the judicially created doctrine of
strict tort liability went far beyond the liberalities of the Code.
The strict liability doctrine is based on breach of a tort duty
running directly from the manufacturer to the consumer. The
breach occurs when an unreasonably dangerous product is placed
on the market. Liability is non-fault-it is no defense that the
manufacturer exercised all possible care in the preparation or sale
of his product. 6 It is usually held that the plaintiff has met his
Commercial Code Marches On, 13 Bus. LAW. 646 (1958). A more liberal
version of § 2-318 was originally drafted in 1950. However, in 1951 it was
replaced by the present version of § 2-318. The wide divergence of state
law privily rules is usually cited as the reason for the change. See Rapson,
Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform
Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 3 UCC REPORrING SERVICE
672, 678 (1967).
" In some jurisdictions the exceptions to the principle of no non-fault
liability without privity were extensive even before the Code was drafted.
The development of exceptions to the general rule, for example, in the food
and ultra-hazardous product cases, is set out in Prosser 1103-14.
"5 Prosser states that Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Sup-
ply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 80 N.W.2d 873 (1958), was the first case to apply
strict tort liability without limiting the principle to a given class of cases,
such as those involving food products intended for human consumption.
Prosser 1112.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of ToRTs § 402A (1965), provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
This section has been adopted in at least six jurisdictions by judicial
decision. See Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) ; Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) ;
Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965); Ford
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burden by showing that (1) an unreasonably dangerous condition
existed while the product was in the manufacturer's hands, that
(2) that this defect caused the injury, while (3) the product was be-
ing used in a normal (or foreseeable) way by (4) an intended user
of it.17
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Code is not pre-
emptive, alternative remedies can in theory apply to many claims-
relief can be granted either on the basis of breach of the Code
warranties or in tort. If this is the case then ideally definite prin-
ciples should govern the decision to give relief on the basis of one
ground or the other. Indefiniteness of legal duties and remedies
in commercial transactions existed before the Code, and was to
have been corrected by the Code. This is a basic argument in favor
of pre-emption. However, in the face of alternative remedies, a
rational method of determining the appropriate basis of liability is
to look to the traditional distinctions made between contract and
tort liability: to the relation between the parties to the action, the
functions of the two actions, the interests protected by each and
the types of loss recoverable in each.
In both actions the effect of plaintiff's recovery is to shift a loss
of some kind from him to the defendant. However, the relation
between the plaintiff and the defendant which existed prior to the
tort or breach of contract is very different. Parties to a contract
have consented to deal with each other, while a tortfeasor and
his victim normally have not. Tort duties have no consensual
basis but are imposed by law.' If the action is on the contract
the rights and duties inter se have previously been consented to by
Motor Co. v. Lonam. 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966). Comment m to § 402A
states:
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions
• ..of the Uniform Commercial Code; and it is not affected by
limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by any limita-
tion to 'buyer' and 'seller' in [the Code]. Nor is the consumer
required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable
time after it occurs, as is provided by [the Code]. The consumer's
cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with
the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected
by any disclaimer or other agreement . .. ."
"7 See note 16 and cases there cited. Prosser states that 22 jurisdictions
have adopted strict liability as to all products on one theory or another.
Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 15 (1966).
8 See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and th? Law of
Torts, 70 YALF L.J. 499 (1961).
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the contracting parties, or, as a minimum, consent to deal has been
given.'9
The function of the two actions is also different. The breach of
contract action is treated as a device for satisfying the performance
expectation bargained for in the contract. The tort action, how-
ever, is intended to restore the plaintiff to the position he occupied
before the tort was committed-to make him whole. 0 Both actions
embody a device-the contemplation-of-the-parties rule in contract
and proximate cause in tort-which effectively reduces the defen-
dant's liability beneath what his misfeasance has caused in fact.
While the standard is roughly the same, reasonable foreseeability,
the function of recovery in the two actions is entirely different
notwithstanding the similarity of the liability limiting rules.
A more basic distinction is in the interests protected by the two
actions. The interest traditionally protected in the contract action
is the performance of promises, on which, supposedly, the fabric of
commercial transactions rests. The interest protected by a tort
action, however, is the personal security of the plaintiff and his
property-freedom from unprivileged interference. 2  To this it
is frequently added that the tort action protects a social interest in
risk (loss) distribution over as wide a range as possible. 2
The consensual-non-consensual distinctions between the two
actions require that if the basis of the plaintiff's claim is that the
defendant did not perform his promise, then privity of contract
or some other consensual relation should exist between the plaintiff
and the defendant. Similarly, if the interest being protected is
promise performing, and/or if the perceived function of the action
is satisfaction of the bargain, then there should be either plaintiff-
defendant privity or some other consensual relation. The qualifi-
cation of "some other consensual relation" is added because it is
possible to conceive of situations where there is no privity of con-
tract yet where each of the contract action distinctions can be made
"9 The distinction made here is not inconsistent with the concept of duties
imposed by law on the contracting parties. The question asked is whether
the plaintiff and the defendant have, or have not, agreed to deal with each
other before the wrong complained of was committed. See L. SIMPsoN,
CONTRACTS § 3 (2d ed. 1965).
20 R. McCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935). The remedy of recission an
exception to this distinction.




in favor of enforcing contract liability, for example, in a third
party beneficiary situation, or where an express warranty has been
made directly to a plaintiff not in privity.
To make a final distinction, there are different types of losses
upon which the two actions operate in a products liability context.
One of these is injury to the person of the plaintiff and to his
property; tort law has traditionally focused here. The other is
economic loss unrelated to personal injury or to injury to the
property other than the product.2 3  This loss lies in the destruction
of the value of the product-loss of the bargain-and traditionally
"The Supreme Courts of California and New Jersey decided oppositely
the question of recovery of pure economic loss in an action to enforce strict
tort liability. In Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,207
A.2d 305 (1965), the plaintiff was permitted to recover the value of the
defective product from the non-privity manufacturer of the product. There
had been no personal injury or injury to property other than the product.
The New Jersey Court stated that in mass marketing transactions the
retailer is a mere conduit, while the manufacturer is the "father of the
product," and his responsibility should be no different where only economic
loss is involved. In Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 1,403 P.2d 145,
5 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), the California court, in dicta, stated its view that
strict tort liability should govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.
The court felt that the breach of warranty action functioned better to com-
pensate plaintiffs for loss of the commercial bargain, and that to impose strict
tort liability for all loss caused by defective products might subject the
manufacturer to liability unknown in scope. Justice Peters, in a carefully
reasoned dissent, pointed out that the majority rationale for imposing strict
tort liability in any circumstance was the theory of loss (or risk) spreading
rather than deterrance to the manufacturer, and that therefore on this
rationale there was no basis to distinguish between physical and non-physical
loss. Id. at 158.
If the rationale of strict liability is loss spreading then there is no legiti-
mate basis for the Seeley distinction. It is often suggested that this problem
does not lend itself to legal analysis but is properly the concern of an econo-
mist. As between an ordinary plaintiff and an ordinary defendant, the
defendant's capacity to spread his loss will depend upon two factors: whether
the risk involved has sufficiently frequency of occurrence to warrant insurance
and if so whether the defendant has had the foresight to insure against it.
If the defendant has no insurance the loss will remain on him if he is found
liable. From an economist's viewpoint this is neither desirable nor un-
desirable since it would accomplish no gain in total utility provided plaintiff
and defendant have roughly the same incomes-the marginal utility of the
dollar amount lost is the same to both. However, if the plaintiff is insured
against the loss and the defendant not, then it is economically preferable for
the loss to remain on the plaintiff for now he can spread it. This reasoning
suggests that liability should turn, on which party is insured. The Code
partially adopts this position in § 2-510 where it is provided that a non-
defaulting party in certain circumstances may, to the extent of his effective
insurance coverage, treat the risk of loss as remaining on the defaulting
party. Prosser, among others, objects to liability turning on insurance
coverage. However, if loss spreading is the only relevant question, the
19681
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is compensible in an action on a contract. The distinction can be
illustrated by comparing the case of a machine which does not work
economic sense of the proposition is unassailable-less total utility is lost
if the party who is insured is found liable.
In the case of the manufacturer defendant, the minimum loss of total
utility is accomplished through his ability to spread the loss by raising prices
to his customers, assuming for now that this is possible. In both the case
of the ordinary defendant who is insured and the manufacturer defendant,
the result is the same, provided that the manufacturer is able to spread his
loss. In the former case the spreading is accomplished through a raise
in the insurer's premiums to all his customers. What makes loss spreading
economically preferable is the concept of diminishing marginal utility. This
posits that each additional unit of consumption has less utility than the one
which preceded it-the second Cadillac does not have as much utility as the
first. By inference, then, each previous unit of consumption has more utility
than the next one. Therefore if one unit of consumption is taken away from
ten people the loss in total utility is less than if ten units of consumption
are taken away from one person. This is because each of the first nine
units, counting back nine through one, has increasing marginal utility, while
the tenth has the least utility of all. See P. SAMUELSON, EcoNomi6s 427-30
(1964); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 527 (1961). However, an economist would quarrel
with the facile assumption that the manufacturer defendant will as a matter
of course be able to distribute his losses through price rises. See Prosser
at 1120. This assumption is implicit in identifying loss spreading as a justi-
fication for strict liability, or, as Justice Peters did in Seeley, setting up
the function of loss spreading as a barrier to distinctions between physical
and economic injury. This is not to say that Justice Peter's argument is
invalid-because there is no indication that it is more difficult for a manu-
facturer to distribute one type of loss than another-but rather to say that
judicial decisions to date have not taken account of relevant economic theory.
The case of the perfect competitor: the perfect competitor is defined as
one who is a mere price taker and can sell as little or as much quantity as
he desires without affecting market price or without shifting his demand
curve either to the left or to the right. The perfect competitor has no power
to raise prices. However, strict liability may result in output reduction.
According to the marginal cost theory of output, the perfect-or any other-
competitor in determining how much quantity to produce is, during the short
run, not concerned with fixed costs but rather will always push quantity to
the point that price equals marginal cost. Where price equals marginal
cost of the last unit of output no more quantity will be produced until price
or marginal cost changes. Therefore, whether strict liability will have any
effect on quantity during the short run depends upon whether the cost of
the liability are fixed-constant with quantity increments-or variable. If
the former is the case strict liability will have no effect on quantity during
the short run, and it has already been noted that the perfect competitor has
no power to raise price. However, if the cost is variable, the effect of strict
liability will be to reduce output during the short run as marginal costs will
reflect this cost. During the long run, if the cost of strict liability is variable
it will have already been included in marginal cost and is removed from
the picture, except that since less quantity is now being produced there will
probably be a slight price rise in the market. However, if the cost is fixed,
during the long run it will cause the perfect competitor to reach a new
equilibrium at a slightly lower quantity and a slightly higher price.
This brief analysis is intended as a model to illustrate that strict liability
[Vol. 46
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and thereby causes loss of profits, with the case of a machine which
blows up and kills everybody.
Applying the principles outlined here to the Code, section 2-318
can be rationalized in contract terms as each of the enumerated
classes of persons can be considered third party beneficiaries of the
buyer's contract. The section does not codify the common law test
of intent to benefit, but it is close enough to the typical third party
beneficiary situation to permit the rationalization. Consent to
deal with members of the buyer's household and guests can fairly
be attributed to the seller. The Code's real reparture from contract
theory is in sections 2-715(2) (b) and 2-719(3). The former
section specifically makes damages for personal injuries recoverable
in a breach of warranty action and the latter deprives the seller
of the power to limit or exclude liability for personal injury if he
has first not disclaimed away all warranties.
While it is settled law that personal injuries are within the
contemplation of the parties rule and recoverable in breach of
warranty,24 this doctrine is the result of using the warranty action
as a vehicle for imposing tort duties on the seller.25 Consequently,
with respect to personal injuries, the contemplation rule in warranty
cases has become indistinguishable from the tort standard of proxi-
mate cause. The original scope of the rule, in pure contract, was
quite different: it was intended to limit liability in the situation
where unforeseeable consequences in a commercial context result
from the non-performance of a contract term, as where, for example,
breach of a time term causes loss of profits.26 It is a conceptual
will not always result in immediate loss spreading through price rises. The
effect of strict liability will vary in the case of the imperfect competitor
and the monopolist from what has been outlined here. See Calabresi, Some
Thought on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The In-
significance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961). See generally Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); Price v. Gatlin, 241
Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); ANNOT., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1090 (1967).
"'E.g., Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175
N.E. 105 (1931). "IT]he law is clear that such damages for personal injury
are recoverable under an ordinary warranty." Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
25 See note 3 supra and materials there cited. See also Fisher, Implied
Warranties of Quality-A Tort Peg in a Contract Hole, 11 FooD DRUG
Cosii. L.J. 262 (1956); Comment, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Pur-
chasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 539 (1966).
" See L. SImpsoN, CoNTRAcTs 396 (2d Ed. 1965); McCormick, The
Contemplation Rule as a Limitation Upon Damages for Breach of Contract,
1968]
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misapplication of the rule to hold that personal injuries are, per se,
within it. The inquiry is misdirected-if a purchaser buys a cig-
arette containing a cancer causing agent this does not necessarily
mean that the seller has breached his contract." If the cigarette is
otherwise of good quality and meets commercial standards the
buyer, arguably, got what he bargained for-a smoke-and an
action on the contract for breach would satisfy neither the bargain
satisfying (purpose of recovery) nor the promise performing (in-
terest protected) rationales of the action. Whether the eventuality
of the buyer contracting cancer was within the contemplation of
the parties is irrelevant.2" Suppose, however, that the buyer was
on the verge of a nervous breakdown and needed a quick smoke
and the seller tendered delivery past the time due. If this failure of
performance causes a nervous breakdown, there is a contemplation
of the parties question, that is, whether the buyer's condition was
previously brought home to the seller. Whether a tort duty, run-
ning from manufacturer to consumer, should be imposed on the
cigarette manufacturer, and then whether this duty has been
breached, are distinct and unrelated matters. The conceptual diffi-
culty that this analysis leads to is in saying that a personal injury-
causing product can be merchantable. However, this is the result
of treating the breach of warranty as a tort.
19 MINN. L. REv. 497 (1935). Amram and Goodman, Some Problems in
the Law of Implied Warranty, 3 SYRACUSE L. REv. 259, 268 (1952), are
critical of cases which "while talking in terms of contract liability for breach
of warranty have in fact imposed a tort standard of 'proximate damage.'"
Pointing to Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44, 5 A.2d 181
(1940), where a store owner recovered for personal injuries when a bottle
of ale exploded, they say, "Her action based on an alleged breach of
warranty that the ale was of merchantable quality, though it could hardly
be argued that personal injuries to a retail merchant were a foreseeable
consequence of a breach of this warranty which is designed to protect com-
mercial interests." Id. at 270. See generally L. FRuMER and M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 16.01(2) (1967).
" See Note, 26 ALBANY L. REv. 354, 359 (1962). But see Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
" It is irrelevant where the buyer is enforcing a contract against the
seller. If, for example, the buyer purchases weed killer which works-it
kills weeds-the seller has fully performed his contract. If the weed killer
also causes the buyer to develop a rash the question is whether the seller
ought to be held liable for marketing a dangerous product, not whether the
injury was within the contemplation of the parties. The contemplation
rule remains viable, however, in contract actions, as where, for example, the
contemplation of the parties must be examined to determine whether the
seller has given a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. See UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
[Vol. 46
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Similarly, depriving the seller of the power to limit or exclude
liability for personal injuries without first disclaiming all warranties
is a departure from contract theory. While it is true that the Code
permits disclaimer of warranties, it is highly unlikely that a seller
interested in the good will or trade name value of his product will
do so in the conspicuous manner which the Code requires. Since only
non-fault liability-common law tort and Code warranty-is being
considered the public policy against limitations of negligence liability
is not present. In this context unconscionability has traditionally
been limited to two situations: where one party because of superior
bargaining power is able to impose remedy depriving limitations of
liability on the other (adhesion contracts), and where fine print, or
ambiguous or otherwise "shady" disclaimers have been used. Both
of these elements are illustrated in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.,2" where an industry wide standard form contract disclaimed all
implied warranties and limited the seller's liability to cost of repair of
the automobiles sold. The contract was held unconscionable. How-
ever, limitations of non-fault liability and disclaimers of warranties
have not traditionally been treated as unconscionable per se."
Apart from the theoretical problems under discussion, the per-
petuation in the Code of the hybrid nature of the sales warranty
can have the effect of retarding the judicial development of other
consumer remedies. In Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 1 the first
major case construing section 2-318, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court gave restrictive effect to the section on the principle enu-
meratio unius est exclusio alterius. The court reasoned that since
the plaintiff, an employee of a purchaser, was not a purchaser nor
one of the classes of persons enumerated in section 2-318, "it is
not for us to legislate or by interpretation to add to legislation mat-
ters which the legislature saw fit not to include."8 2  On the ground
2 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
"See generally Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Dis-
claimers and Warranties, 4 BOSTON COL. IND. and CoM. L. REv. 285 (1963)."1409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
" 409 Pa. 614, 187 A.2d 577 (1963). Three years later the Pennsylvania
court adopted § 402A of the Restatement of Torts verbatim. Webb v. Zern,
422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). See, for cases following Hochgertel,
Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chemical Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.
Pa. 1964); Driver v. F. A. Mitchell Co., 35 F.R.D. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 216 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa.
1963). Cf. Phares v. Dandia Lumber Co., 62 N.M. 90, 305 P.2d 367, 370
(1957). Note that a judicial hat hanging peg-to avoid the Hochgertel
result--exists in section 1-103 of the Code. See note 11 supra.
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that the section was too restrictive it was not enacted in California
and Utah. 3  To the argument that the official comments state the
overall neutrality of the Code on the issue of privity, the Pennsyl-
vania court answered that the legislature did not enact the comments.
While in fairness it should be said that courts construing the Code
tend to refer to the comments, the doubtful status of the comments-
they are not law nor are they legislative history84-- presents a prob-
lem in jurisdictions where legislative histories may shed no light
on the legislative purpose behind section 2-318. 1 The pre-emption
argument, if it is relevant to Hochgertel, is probably neutral as to
the Hochgertel result-the fact that the Code pre-empts sales reme-
dies does not indicate one way or another whether a court should
religiously restrict the scope of the Code remedies. What the pre-
emption argument militates against is the total by-passing of the
Code remedies in favor of a common law remedy. 0 This argument,
" See CALIFORNIA SENATE FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART I, THE UNIFORM'
COMMERCIAL CODE 457-58 (1959-61): Comment, Implied Warranty, Strict
Tort Liability for Personal Injuries, And the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-318, 13 KAN. L. REv. 411 (1965). In addition, non-uniform versions of
section 2-318 have been enacted in ten states. REPORT No. 3 OF THE PERMA-
NENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 13 (1967).
This report proposes two alternative amendments for states dissatisfied with
section 2-318. Alternative B states that "A seller's warranty whether ex-
press or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section." Alternative C states that "A seller's warranty
whether express or implied extends to any person who may be reasonably
be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and is injured by
breach of warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom
the warranty extends." The accompanying proposed amendments to the
official comments to section 2-318 state generally that the purpose of the
proposals is to extend the protection of the Code warranties consistent with
case law liberalization of the privity rules. Id. at 14.
" See E. FARNSWORTH, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 7-8 (2d ed. 1965).
In Henry v. John W. Eshelman & Sons, 209 A.2d 46 (R.I. 1965), the Rhode
Island Supreme Court interpreted the official comment to section 2-318 to
mean that the legislature had left it to the courts to determine whether the
privity rules ought to be abrogated in warranty actions. This approach
seems to equate the comments with legislative history, which they are not.
" However, just as it can be asked whether the comments reflect legisla-
tive intent, it can also be asked whether the intention to pre-empt which
Hawkland attributes to the drafters was adopted by the legislature in enacting
the Code. The difference, however, is that there is statutory authority for
the pre-emption argument. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-103,
1-104. See note 11 supra.
" But see Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966), and
[Vol. 46
UCC SALES WARRANTIES
however, did not trouble the Pennsylvania court-three years after
Hochgertel, in Webb v. Zern,3 7 it adopted section 402A of the Re-
statement of Torts as a rule of law in products liability cases.
Beyond the problems so far discussed, there are other "intrica-
cies of sales law" relevant to warranty relief which have (neces-
sarily) been included in the Code. Principally these are the sale of
goods requirement and the notice giving requirement.
The Code requires that all defendants in breach of warranty
actions shall be sellers of goods."8 Section 2-108 defines a sale as
the "passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." A
literal application of the Code terms precludes the possibility of
successful warranty actions against the sellers of services, bailors
and lessors. While the word "seller" sometimes creeps into strict
tort liability formulations,"9 the tort liability principle is not bur-
dened with a background of sales case law interpretation of the
words, "sale," "seller" and "goods." Further, the judicial doctrine
of strict tort liability is not circumscribed by the jurisprudential
arguments which may influence the construction of the Code.
In Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Service,40 the New
Jersey Supreme Court extended strict tort liability to the leasing
of motor vehicles. In doing so, the court made passing reference41
to the official comment to section 2-313 which states the intention of
the drafters that the Code provisions were not intended to restrict
case law application of the warranties to non-sale transactions. The
case illustrates that it is conceptually a simple matter to extend tort
liability to non-sale transactions. The word "seller" in the Code
does not have to be tortured into meaning "lessor," and the impo-
sition of liability can be frankly made on the basis of policy.
Section 2-314 specifically provides that the serving for value
of food or drink for consumption either on the premises or else-
where is a sale. Beyond this provision, the Code leaves unresolved
the problems arising from the distinction between the sale of goods
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). In both
of these cases the court felt that section 2-318 was inapplicable because strict
liability in tort was the basis for relief. These cases also ignored the pre-
emption argument.
'7422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
fl See note 8 supra.
"It is used in SECTION 402A OF TuE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. See note
16 supra.
,45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
"The adoption of the Code post-dated the facts of the case.
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and the sale of services. In Epstein v. Giannattasio,4 2 a Connecti-
cut court held that a beauty parlor treatment was a sale of services
and there could be no breach of the Code warranties.
The notice giving requirement of the Code should not prove to
be burdensome to consumer recovery for breach of the Code war-
ranties. While the requirement of giving notice of breach within
a reasonable time is usually pointed out as one of the principle dif-
ferences between tort and warranty liability, the notice giving re-
quirement is not that much more exacting than the requirement
common to both actions of bringing suit within the time provided
by the statute of limitations. In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co.,4 3 a cigarette smoker gave notice to the manufacturer
ten months after the smoker's lung was removed that he was electing
to treat the purchase of cigarettes allegedly containing cancer causing
agents as a breach of warranty. After having been persuaded that
the delayed notice did not prejudice the manufacturer, the court held
that this notice was not insufficient as a matter of law. In a non-
Code case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,44 the California
court dispensed with the notice requirement altogether in an action
for breach of warranty where personal injury damages had been
alleged. The court held that the seller's liability was properly in
tort and therefore the sales law concept of notice had no application.
The distinction is logical. The function of giving notice in a com-
mercial context is to permit the seller to repair whatever the breach
has caused. In a personal injury context this is impossible. However,
the Code does require notice of breach45 and where the Code war-
ranty remedies are used to recover personal injury damages the
Greenman result cannot follow.
Section 2-725 (1) provides that an action for breach of warranty
must be brought within four years after the action has accrued.
Further, section 2-725 (2) indicates that an action accrues when the
breach occurs, upon tender of delivery of the defective product,
"regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach." The import of this section is that if an injury occurs
more than four years after tender of delivery the buyer cannot
4225 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963). See generally Farnsworth,
rinplied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUm. L. REV. 653
(1957), and cases there cited; 43 N.C.L. REv. 1019 (1965).
" 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
"'27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
" Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607(3) (a).
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commence an action. The problem raised by this section is that
most states have tort statutes shorter than four years, which, in
view of the hybrid nature of the warranty,46 may result in interesting
categorizations of the liability which a plaintiff is seeking to en-
force. There has been no pattern of repeal or modification of exist-
ing statutes of limitations upon adoption of the Code.
Conclusion
No matter how liberally the Code warranties are construed they
remain circumscribed by the "intricacies of the law of sales."
4
1
Notice, disclaimers, etc., are the children of sales law and their
parentage is a judicial bias in favor of protecting struggling nine-
teenth century industry vis-a-vis consumer plaintiffs. Serious
jurisprudential problems arise, furthermore, when the Code sales
law is by-passed in favor of parallel common law tort remedies. If
Hotchgertel" proves to be a prototype of judicial reasoning under
the Code, the ultimate effect of the sections under discussion may
be to retard the growth of non-fault tort remedies. Further, the
hybrid mixture of contract and tort law in the sales warranty results
in hazy, poorly reasoned conceptualizations of the basis of liability
in products liability cases.50
"' See Fisher, Implied Warranties of Quality-A Tort Peg in a Contract
Hole, 11 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 262 (1956); Comment, Manufacturer's
Liability to Remote Purchasers For "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or
Contract? 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1966).
"' See Freedman, Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 10 PIRAc. LAw., April 1964, at 49, 64.
" More differences flow from affixing the label "breach of contract" to
the plaintiff's action than the ones under discussion. The contract action
will not normally permit recovery for wrongful death. The contract action
may fail for uncertainty, illegality, want of consideration, or because of the
statute of frauds or the parole evidence rule, or because of infancy or dis-
charge in bankruptcy. Different conflicts and joinder rules may apply, and
the plaintiff may only be able to bring a single action for multiple breaches.
See W. PROSSER, TORTs 641-2 (3d ed. 1964) and cases there cited. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539, 542 (D. Minn. 1964); Colonna v.
Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936).
"'409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963). Frumer and Friedman have
analyzed the possible consequences of section 2-318 and conclude that it
should not prove to be restrictive. L. FRUMER and M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 16.04(3) (1967). But see Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.
L. Rzv. 281 (1961); 13 KAN. L. REv. 411 (1965); 31 BROoLyx L. REv.
367 (1965).
o [W]e hold the bottler, of a Pepsi-Cola which the non-privity
plaintiff purchased, by advertising and sales promotion addressed
to the consumer, induced her to 'Come Alive' and that she was 'in
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It has been pointed out that it is perfectly consistent to insist
on privity in contract cases and at the same time impose non-fault
tort liability in the absence of privity on the basis of other policies.5 1
Further, the existence of contractual remedies, where there is manu-
facturer--consumer privity, does not bar tort remedies in the case
of tortuous conduct. Prosser makes the distinction that when the
defendant's misfeasance goes beyond breaching the terms of his
contract, then the proper basis of liability is in tort. 2
It has already been noted that the inclusion of personal injuries
within the contemplation rule is the consequence of imposing seller
tort duties through the sales warranty.5 3 Sections 2-715(2) (b)
and 2-719(3) perpetuate this. The inclusion of damages for per-
sonal injury as a normal element of recovery in a contract action
and the prohibition against limitations of (non-fault) liability for
personal injury commingle two distinct legal relationships-that
between two parties to a contract and that between a tortfeasor and
his victim. If there is something to be said for conceptual clarity
in the law, these two sections do not say it. 4
The repeal of sections 2-318, 2-715(2)(b) and 2-719(3) is
suggested. Repeal of these sections would leave the privity doctrine
viable in warranty actions, would limit recovery to the loss of the
commercial bargain and would permit the seller to limit or exclude
non-fault personal injury liability. The Code warranty protection
would then be limited to implementing the traditional promise
performing and bargain satisfying rationales of the breach of
contract action. As Prosser argues and as several courts have
the Pepsi Generation.' . . . The evidence in this case was sufficient
to go to the jury on the theory implied warranty resulting from the
manner in which the Pepsi-Cola was advertised and traveled from
the bottler to the plaintiff.
Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967).
"Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare went on. "I
do," Alice hastily replied; "at least I mean what I say-that's the
same thing you know." "Not the same thing a bit I" said the Hatter.
"Why you might just as well say that 'I see what I eat' is the same
as 'I eat what I see' !"
LEwIs CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND.
"1 See Byrd and Dobbs, Torts, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 43
N.C.L. REV. 906, 937 (1965).
" W. PROSsER, TORTS 641 (3d ed. 1964).
"See note 3 and materials there cited.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-102(2) and 1-102(2) (a) state:
"Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are (a) to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." (Emphasis
added).
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concluded, the breach of warranty action is an unsuitable vehicle
for tort recovery.55 Yet at the same time it remains a viable instru-
ment for protecting the integrity of the commercial bargain and
affording relief in the case of breach.
The suggestions made presuppose the continuing rapid develop-
ment of the remedy of strict tort liability and are not intended to
affect the problem of unconscionable contracts. 56
SAMUEL HOLLINGSWORTH, JR.
"See Prosser 1127. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Ca. Rptr. 697 (1963).
" See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).

